

Identifying Important Features for Intrusion Detection Using Support Vector Machines and Neural Networks

Andrew H. Sung, Srinivas Mukkamala
{sung, srinivas}@cs.nmt.edu
Department of Computer Science
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
Socorro New Mexico, 87801

ABSTRACT

Intrusion detection is a critical component of secure information systems. This paper addresses the issue of identifying important input features in building an intrusion detection system (IDS). Since elimination of the insignificant and/or useless inputs leads to a simplification of the problem, faster and more accurate detection may result. Feature ranking and selection, therefore, is an important issue in intrusion detection.

In this paper we apply the technique of deleting one feature at a time to perform experiments on SVMs and neural networks to rank the importance of input features for the DARPA collected intrusion data. Important features for each of the 5 classes of intrusion patterns in the DARPA data are identified.

It is shown that SVM-based and neural network based IDSs using a reduced number of features can deliver enhanced or comparable performance. An IDS for class-specific detection based on five SVMs is proposed.

1. Introduction

The data we used in our experiments originated from MIT's Lincoln Lab. It is developed for intrusion detection system evaluations by DARPA and is considered a benchmark for intrusion detection evaluations [13]. This paper mainly addresses the issue of identifying important input features for intrusion detection. Since the ability to identify the important inputs and redundant inputs of a classifier leads directly to reduced size, faster training and possibly more accurate results, it is critical to be able to identify the important features of network traffic data for intrusion detection in order for the IDS to achieve maximal performance.

Since most of the intrusions can be uncovered by examining patterns of user activities, many intrusion detection systems have been built by utilizing the recognized attack and misuse patterns to develop learning machines [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]. In our earlier work, support vector machines (SVMs) are found to be superior to neural networks in many important respects of intrusion detection [10,11,12], so we will illustrate feature ranking using SVMs and neural networks.

We performed experiments to rank the importance of input features for each of the five classes (normal, probe, denial of service, user to super user, remote to local) of the patterns in the DARPA data. It is shown that using only the important features for classification gives good accuracies and, in certain cases, reduces the training time and testing time of the SVM classifier.

In the rest of the paper, a brief introduction to the data we used is given in section 2. In section 3 we describe the method of deleting one input feature at a time and the performance metrics considered for deciding the importance of a particular feature. In section 4 describes the experiments using support vector machines and neural networks. In section 5 we present the experimental results of using support vector machines for feature ranking. In section 6 we present the experimental results of using neural networks for feature ranking. In section 7 we summarize our results and give a brief description of our proposed IDS architecture.

2. The data

In the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation program, an environment was set up to acquire raw TCP/IP dump data for a network by simulating a typical U.S. Air Force LAN. The LAN was operated like a true environment, but being blasted with multiple attacks. For each TCP/IP connection, 41 various quantitative and qualitative features were extracted. Of

this database a subset of 494021 data were used, of which 20% represent normal patterns.

Attack types fall into four main categories:

1. DOS: denial of service
2. R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine
3. U2R: unauthorized access to local super user (root) privileges
4. Probing: surveillance and other probing

3. Ranking the significance of inputs

Feature selection and ranking is an important issue in intrusion detection. Of the large number of features that can be monitored for intrusion detection purpose, which are truly useful, which are less significant, and which may be useless? The question is relevant because the elimination of useless features (or audit trail reduction) enhances the accuracy of detection while speeding up the computation, thus improving the overall performance of an IDS. In cases where there are no useless features, by concentrating on the most important ones we may well improve the time performance of an IDS without affecting the accuracy of detection in statistically significant ways.

The feature ranking and selection problem for intrusion detection is similar in nature to various engineering problems that are characterized by Having a large number of input variables $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ of varying degrees of importance; i.e., some elements of \mathbf{x} are essential, some are less important, some of them may not be mutually independent, and some may be useless or noise Lacking an analytical model or mathematical formula that precisely describes the input-output relationship, $y = F(\mathbf{x})$

Having available a finite set of experimental data, based on which a model (e.g. neural networks) can be built for simulation and prediction purposes

Due to the lack of an analytical model, one can only seek to determine the relative importance of the input variables through empirical methods. A complete analysis would require examination of all possibilities, e.g., taking two variables at a time to analyze their dependence or correlation, then taking three at a time, etc. This, however, is both infeasible (requiring 2^n experiments!) and not infallible (since the available data may be of poor quality in sampling the whole input space). In the following, therefore, we apply the technique of deleting one feature at a time [14] to rank the input features and identify the most important ones for intrusion detection using SVMs and neural networks.

3.1. Methodology for ranking importance

We first describe the input ranking methodology: One input feature is deleted from the data at a time, the resultant data set is then used for the training and testing of the classifier. Then the classifier's performance is compared to that of the original classifier (based on all features) in terms of relevant performance criteria. Finally, the importance of the feature is ranked according to a set of rules based on the performance comparison. The procedure is summarized as follows:

1. Delete one input feature from the (training and testing) data
2. Use the resultant data set for training and testing the classifier
3. Analyze the results of the classifier, using the performance metrics
4. Rank the importance of the feature according to the rules
5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 for each of the input features

3.2. Performance metrics for support vector machines

To rank the importance of the 41 features (of the DARPA data) in SVM-based IDS, we consider three main performance criteria: overall accuracy of (5-class) classification; training time; and testing time. Each feature will be ranked as "important", "secondary", or "insignificant", according to the following rules that are applied to the result of performance comparison of the original 41-feature SVM and the 40-feature SVM:

Rule set:

- *If accuracy decreases and training time increases and testing time decreases, then the feature is important*
- *If accuracy decreases and training time increases and testing time increases, then the feature is important*
- *If accuracy decreases and training time decreases and testing time increases, then the feature is important*
- *If accuracy unchanged and training time increases and testing time increases, then the feature is important*
- *If accuracy unchanged and training time decreases and testing time increases, then the feature is secondary*
- *If accuracy unchanged and training time increases and testing time decreases, then the feature is secondary*

- *If accuracy* unchanges *and* training time decreases *and* testing time decreases, *then* the feature is insignificant
- *If accuracy* increases *and* training time increases *and* testing time decreases, *then* the feature is secondary
- *If accuracy* increases *and* training time decreases *and* testing time increases, *then* the feature is secondary
- *If accuracy* increases *and* training time decreases *and* testing time decreases, *then* the feature is insignificant

3.3. Performance metrics for neural networks

To rank the importance of the 41 features (of the DARPA data) in neural network based model, we consider three main performance criteria: overall accuracy (*OA*) of (5-class) classification; false positive rate (*FP*); and false negative rate (*FN*). Each feature will be ranked as “important”, “secondary”, or “insignificant”, according to the following rules that are applied to the result of performance comparison of the original 41-feature neural network and the 40-feature neural network:

Rule set:

- *If OA* increases *and FP* decreases *and FN* decreases, then the feature is unimportant
- *If OA* increases *and FP* increases *and FN* decreases, then the feature is unimportant
- *If OA* decreases *and FP* increases *and FN* increases, then the feature is important
- *If OA* decreases *and FP* decreases *and FN* increases, then the feature is important
- *If OA* un-changes *and FP* un-changes, then the feature is secondary

Our performance metrics and the rules for deciding the importance of the input features are not limited to the above-mentioned ones; they can be modified depending on the complexity and the nature of the problem.

4. Experiments

Support vector machines and neural networks are used for ranking the importance of the input features, taking above mentioned performance metrics and the rule set into consideration [15]. Once the importance of the input features was ranked, the classifiers were trained and tested with only the important features. Further, we validate our methodology by comparing the performance of the classifier using all input features to that using the important and the secondary

features; and we also compare the performance of a classifier using the union of the important features for all five classes.

(Because SVMs are only capable of binary classifications, we will need to employ five SVMs for the five-class identification problem in intrusion detection. But since the set of important features may differ from class to class, using five SVMs becomes an advantage rather than a hindrance, i.e., in building an IDS using five SVMs, each SVM can use only the important features for that class which it is responsible for making classifications.)

5. Support vector machines

Support vector machines, or SVMs, are learning machines that plot the training vectors in high-dimensional feature space, labeling each vector by its class. SVMs classify data by determining a set of support vectors, which are members of the set of training inputs that outline a hyper plane in the feature space [12].

SVMs provide a generic mechanism to fit the surface of the hyper plane to the data through the use of a kernel function. The user may provide a function (e.g., linear, polynomial, or sigmoid) to the SVMs during the training process, which selects support vectors along the surface of this function. The number of free parameters used in the SVMs depends on the margin that separates the data points but not on the number of input features, thus SVMs do not require a reduction in the number of features in order to avoid over fitting--an apparent advantage in applications such as intrusion detection. Another primary advantage of SVMs is the low expected probability of generalization errors.

There are other reasons that we use SVMs for intrusion detection. The first is speed: as real-time performance is of primary importance to intrusion detection systems, any classifier that can potentially run “fast” is worth considering. The second reason is scalability: SVMs are relatively insensitive to the number of data points and the classification complexity does not depend on the dimensionality of the feature space [14], so they can potentially learn a larger set of patterns and thus be able to scale better than neural networks. Once the data is classified into two classes, a suitable optimizing algorithm can be used if necessary for further feature identification, depending on the application [14].

5.1 Experiments using support vector machines

Our results are summarized in the following tables. Table 1 gives the performance results of the five SVMs for each respective class of data. Table 6 through Table 10 in the appendix, each containing the results of 41 experiments; give the performance statistics of the SVM with 40 features. Table 2 shows the results of SVMs performing classification, with each SVM using as input the important features for all five classes. Table 3 shows the results of SVMs performing classification, with each SVM using as input the union of the important features for all five classes. Table 4 shows the result of SVMs performing classification, with each SVM using as input the important and secondary features for each respective class.

Table1: Performance of SVMs using 41 features

Class	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
Normal	7.66	1.26	99.55
Probe	49.13	2.10	99.70
DOS	22.87	1.92	99.25
U2Su	3.38	1.05	99.87
R2L	11.54	1.02	99.78

Table2: Performance of SVMs using important features

Class	No of Features	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
Normal	25	9.36	1.07	99.59
Probe	7	37.71	1.87	99.38
DOS	19	22.79	1.84	99.22
U2Su	8	2.56	0.85	99.87
R2L	6	8.76	0.73	99.78

Table3: Performance of SVMs using union of important features (30)

Class	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
Normal	7.67	1.02	99.51
Probe	44.38	2.07	99.67
DOS	18.64	1.41	99.22
U2Su	3.23	0.98	99.87
R2L	9.81	1.01	99.78

Table4: Performance of SVMs using important and secondary features

Class	No of Features	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
Normal	39	8.15	1.22	99.59
Probe	32	47.56	2.09	99.65
DOS	32	19.72	2.11	99.25
U2Su	25	2.72	0.92	99.87
R2L	37	8.25	1.25	99.80

6. Neural networks

Artificial neural network consists of a collection of processing elements that are highly interconnected and transform a set of desired outputs [4,5,11]. The result of the transformation is determined by the characteristics of the elements and the weights associated with the interconnections among them. A neural network conducts an analysis of the information and provides a probability estimate that it matches with the data it has been trained to recognize. The neural network gains the experience initially by training the system with both the input and out put of the desired problem. The network configuration is refined until satisfactory results are obtained. The neural network gains experience over a period as it is being trained on the data related to the problem.

6.1. Experiments using neural networks

Our results are summarized in the following tables. Table 11 in the appendix gives the results of 42 experiments; gives the performance statistics of the neural networks with 41 features and 40 features. Table 5 gives the comparison of neural network using all 41 features to that of using 34 important features.

Table5: Neural network results using all 34 important features

No of features	Accuracy (%)	False positive rate	False negative rate	Number of epochs
41	87.07	6.66	6.27	412
34	81.57	18.19	0.25	27

Using all 41 features the network converged at 412 epochs, while using 34 important features the network converged at 27 epochs reducing the training time and false negative rate.

7. Summary & conclusions

Comparing Table 1 with Tables 2, 3, 4, and Table 11 with Table 5 we observe that

- The most important features for the two classes of ‘Normal’ and ‘DOS’ heavily overlap
- ‘U2Su’ and ‘R2L’, the two smallest classes representing the most serious attacks, each has a small number of important features and a large number of secondary features
- The performances of (a) using the important features for each class, Table 2, (b) using the union of important features, Table 3, and (c) using the union of important and secondary features for each class, do not show significant differences, and are all similar to that of using all 41 features
- Using the important features for each class gives the most remarkable performance: the testing time decreases in each class; the accuracy increases slightly for one class ‘Normal’, decreases slightly for two classes ‘Probe’ and ‘DoS’, and remains the same for the two most serious attack classes.
- The performances of using the important features do not show significant differences to that of using all 41 features.

Using the important features gives the most remarkable performance in terms of training time.

Our ongoing experiments include making 23-class (22 specific attacks and normal) feature identification using SVMs and neural networks, for designing a cost-effective and real time intrusion detection tool.

8. Acknowledgments

Support for this research received from ICASA (Institute for Complex Additive Systems Analysis, a division of New Mexico Tech) and a U.S. Department of Defense IASP capacity building grant is gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to acknowledge many insightful conversations with Dr. Jean-Louis Lassez and David Duggan that helped clarify some of our ideas.

9. References

- [1] Denning D (Feb 1987) An Intrusion-Detection Model. *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering*, Vol.SE-13, No 2.
- [2] Kumar S, Spafford EH (1994) An Application of Pattern Matching in Intrusion Detection. Technical Report CSD-TR-94-013. Purdue University.
- [3] Ghosh AK. (1999). Learning Program Behavior Profiles for Intrusion Detection. *USENIX*.
- [4] Cannady J. (1998) Artificial Neural Networks for Misuse Detection. *National Information Systems Security Conference*.
- [5] Ryan J, Lin M-J, Miikkulainen R (1998) Intrusion Detection with Neural Networks. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 10*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- [6] Debar H, Becke M, Siboni D (1992) A Neural Network Component for an Intrusion Detection System. *Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy*.
- [7] Debar H, Dorizzi B (1992) An Application of a Recurrent Network to an Intrusion Detection System. *Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks*, pp.78-83.
- [8] Luo J, Bridges SM (2000) Mining Fuzzy Association Rules and Fuzzy Frequency Episodes for Intrusion Detection. *International Journal of Intelligent Systems*, John Wiley & Sons, pp.687-703.
- [9] Cramer M, et. al. (1995) New Methods of Intrusion Detection using Control-Loop Measurement. *Proceedings of the Technology in Information Security Conference (TISC) '95*, pp.1-10.
- [10] S Mukkamala, G Janowski, A H. Sung Monitoring Information System Security, *Proceedings of the 11th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies & Systems (December 2001)*, pp.139-144.
- [11] S Mukkamala, G Janowski, A H. Sung Intrusion Detection Using Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines *Proceedings of IEEE International Joint Conference on Neural Networks 2002 (Hawaii, May 2002)*, pp.1702-1707.
- [12] Srinivas Mukkamala, A H. Sung (2002) Comparison of Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines in Intrusion Detection Workshop on Statistical and Machine Learning Techniques in Computer Intrusion Detection, June 11-13, 2002 <http://www.mts.jhu.edu/~cidwkshop/abstracts.html>
- [13] <http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/task.htm>.
- [14] Sung AH (1998) Ranking Importance of Input Parameters Of Neural Networks. *Expert Systems with Applications*, pp.405-411.
- [15] Joachims T (2000) SVMlight is an implementation of Support Vector Machines (SVMs) in C. http://ais.gmd.de/~thorsten/svm_light. University of Dortmund. Collaborative Research Center on “Complexity Reduction in Multivariate Data” (SFB475).
- [16] Joachims T (1998) Making Large-Scale SVM Learning Practical. LS8-Report, University of Dortmund, LS VIII-Report.
- [17] Vladimir VN (1995) The Nature of Statistical Learning Theory. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York.
- [18] Joachims T (2000) Estimating the Generalization Performance of a SVM Efficiently. *Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning*, Morgan Kaufman.

10. Appendix

Table6: Class 1, Normal

Feature deleted	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
None	7.66	1.26	99.55
1.	10.19	1.11	99.51
2.	6.56	1.46	99.55
3.	9.06	1.47	99.48
4.	9.96	1.08	99.55
5.	33.11	1.62	99.19
6.	7.56	1.79	98.75
7.	7.11	1.43	99.55
8.	8.33	1.41	99.55
9.	8.37	1.37	99.55
10.	8.68	1.35	99.55
11.	7.49	1.33	99.55
12.	8.01	1.38	99.55
13.	7.14	0.81	99.55
14.	8.00	1.46	99.55
15.	9.81	1.43	99.55
16.	8.15	1.04	99.55
17.	8.12	1.47	99.55
18.	7.36	1.30	99.55
19.	8.00	1.12	99.55
20.	8.15	1.38	99.55
21.	7.98	1.42	99.55
22.	8.12	1.43	99.55
23.	7.65	1.34	99.56
24.	7.29	1.30	99.55
25.	8.32	1.35	99.55
26.	7.71	1.30	99.55
27.	7.73	1.38	99.55
28.	7.90	1.47	99.55
29.	7.81	1.39	99.55
30.	7.57	1.38	99.55
31.	7.11	1.30	99.55
32.	6.17	1.26	99.55
33.	8.53	1.51	99.48
34.	7.23	1.48	99.55
35.	6.96	1.35	99.55
36.	10.19	1.36	99.55
37.	6.74	1.33	99.55
38.	8.17	1.43	99.55
39.	7.75	1.32	99.55
40.	7.20	1.45	99.55

41.	9.38	1.43	99.55
-----	------	------	-------

Table7: Class 2, Probe

Feature deleted	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
None	49.13	2.10	99.70
1.	58.93	2.01	99.70
2.	44.07	1.79	99.70
3.	51.00	2.19	99.61
4.	62.42	1.85	99.70
5.	75.67	1.97	98.14
6.	51.03	1.17	99.52
7.	51.62	1.98	99.70
8.	55.34	1.88	99.72
9.	53.05	1.99	99.70
10.	46.29	2.00	99.70
11.	45.68	1.96	99.70
12.	53.18	1.95	99.70
13.	55.27	1.95	99.70
14.	50.67	1.92	99.70
15.	49.50	2.07	99.70
16.	47.61	2.16	99.70
17.	49.38	1.93	99.70
18.	50.28	1.91	99.70
19.	50.33	1.94	99.70
20.	48.61	1.93	99.70
21.	50.40	1.89	99.70
22.	51.50	1.96	99.70
23.	49.00	2.63	99.46
24.	42.86	1.97	99.61
25.	52.40	1.95	99.71
26.	52.42	1.99	99.71
27.	62.51	2.05	99.71
28.	71.80	1.91	99.71
29.	45.95	1.78	99.70
30.	46.62	2.00	99.70
31.	46.35	1.93	99.70
32.	31.89	1.82	99.67
33.	50.90	1.83	99.62
34.	47.64	1.30	99.70
35.	49.49	1.87	99.70
36.	47.39	1.97	99.70
37.	48.19	2.03	99.70
38.	57.51	1.85	99.71
39.	52.54	1.94	99.71
40.	56.45	1.98	99.70
41.	51.66	1.71	99.70

Table8: Class 3, Denial of Service

Feature	Training	Testing	Accuracy
---------	----------	---------	----------

deleted	Time (sec)	Time (sec)	(%)
None	22.87	1.92	99.25
1.	21.76	1.87	99.23
2.	23.60	1.89	99.25
3.	17.88	2.03	99.10
4.	20.00	1.79	99.25
5.	39.57	1.61	97.55
6.	19.63	0.84	98.07
7.	23.76	1.87	99.25
8.	31.23	1.86	99.20
9.	23.80	1.78	99.25
10.	27.01	1.82	99.25
11.	22.03	1.86	99.25
12.	19.69	1.84	99.25
13.	21.30	1.93	99.25
14.	20.18	2.02	99.25
15.	18.76	1.89	99.25
16.	21.56	1.78	99.25
17.	22.98	2.09	99.25
18.	21.47	1.95	99.25
19.	20.79	1.97	99.25
20.	21.49	1.96	99.25
21.	21.75	1.94	99.25
22.	24.93	2.01	99.25
23.	23.94	3.01	98.58
24.	25.43	2.05	99.20
25.	21.70	1.80	99.19
26.	25.93	1.98	99.19
27.	24.21	1.41	99.20
28.	26.16	1.80	99.20
29.	29.99	1.93	99.25
30.	18.27	1.79	99.20
31.	19.85	1.79	99.25
32.	11.70	0.95	98.69
33.	44.19	1.74	99.19
34.	28.27	1.88	99.25
35.	28.94	1.75	99.22
36.	27.39	1.80	99.22
37.	22.40	1.86	99.25
38.	22.45	1.95	99.19
39.	23.81	1.92	99.20
40.	50.15	1.84	99.22
41.	25.36	2.03	99.19

Table9: Class 4, User to Root

Feature deleted	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
None	3.38	1.05	99.87
1.	2.98	0.96	99.87

2.	3.35	0.98	99.87
3.	3.00	1.04	99.87
4.	3.21	1.04	99.87
5.	3.11	0.65	99.72
6.	1.99	0.18	88.81
7.	3.40	1.07	99.87
8.	3.43	1.10	99.87
9.	3.37	0.97	99.87
10.	3.69	0.97	99.87
11.	3.47	1.06	99.87
12.	3.36	0.99	99.87
13.	3.61	1.01	99.87
14.	3.12	1.02	99.87
15.	3.40	1.11	99.87
16.	3.57	1.14	99.87
17.	3.39	0.98	99.87
18.	3.46	1.07	99.87
19.	3.41	1.05	99.87
20.	3.35	1.10	99.87
21.	3.34	1.08	99.87
22.	3.26	1.07	99.87
23.	3.39	1.05	99.87
24.	3.32	1.07	99.87
25.	3.44	1.09	99.87
26.	3.38	1.06	99.87
27.	3.36	1.05	99.87
28.	3.23	1.00	99.87
29.	3.36	0.98	99.87
30.	3.42	0.98	99.87
31.	3.34	1.00	99.87
32.	3.95	0.92	99.84
33.	4.58	0.99	99.85
34.	3.36	1.02	99.87
35.	2.98	1.05	99.87
36.	3.50	1.05	99.87
37.	3.43	1.00	99.87
38.	3.79	1.05	99.87
39.	3.27	1.07	99.87
40.	3.36	0.99	99.87
41.	3.36	1.01	99.87

Table10: Class 5, Remote to Local

Feature deleted	Training Time (sec)	Testing Time (sec)	Accuracy (%)
None	11.54	1.02	99.78
1.	7.54	1.04	99.80
2.	8.79	1.23	99.78
3.	9.95	1.11	99.75
4.	8.56	1.26	99.78
5.	12.11	1.79	99.06

6.	16.52	0.63	98.88
7.	10.18	1.34	99.78
8.	9.59	1.31	99.78
9.	8.41	1.23	99.78
10.	9.30	1.32	99.78
11.	10.21	1.23	99.78
12.	9.48	1.33	99.78
13.	9.88	1.29	99.78
14.	8.84	1.22	99.78
15.	9.25	1.28	99.78
16.	8.89	1.20	99.78
17.	9.21	1.24	99.78
18.	9.60	1.30	99.78
19.	10.15	1.30	99.78
20.	10.68	0.99	99.78
21.	10.99	1.26	99.78
22.	10.88	1.26	99.78
23.	8.19	1.26	99.78
24.	7.67	1.22	99.72
25.	9.26	1.05	99.78
26.	10.11	1.30	99.78
27.	9.09	1.24	99.78
28.	9.10	1.23	99.78
29.	11.39	1.11	99.78
30.	10.64	1.26	99.78
31.	8.56	1.26	99.78
32.	11.55	1.05	99.80
33.	12.35	1.25	99.80
34.	10.59	1.14	99.78
35.	9.07	1.18	99.78
36.	9.22	1.22	99.78
37.	9.33	1.30	99.78
38.	8.98	0.95	99.78
39.	8.52	1.26	99.78
40.	8.98	1.11	99.78
41.	10.35	1.26	99.78

11	75.81	23.79	0.41	331
12	81.64	17.84	0.52	471
13	69.40	4.82	25.78	406
14	71.39	6.14	22.47	494
15	71.93	3.99	24.08	389
16	77.50	4.89	17.61	351
17	75.60	4.21	20.19	377
18	72.09	3.47	24.44	388
19	85.36	4.45	10.29	421
20	79.09	20.30	0.61	314
21	79.09	20.30	0.61	324
22	89.20	9.94	0.86	591
23	62.38	36.76	0.86	379
24	89.16	10.06	0.78	368
25	78.45	20.61	0.94	420
26	77.58	21.61	0.81	427
27	79.03	20.48	0.49	380
28	75.43	24.12	0.45	358
29	94.82	4.21	0.97	345
30	78.01	20.60	1.39	301
31	89.13	10.20	0.67	393
32	82.71	16.36	0.93	398
33	58.72	40.25	1.03	418
34	75.24	23.88	0.89	511
35	53.08	46.28	0.64	436
36	76.62	22.70	0.68	459
37	72.98	26.49	0.54	349
38	74.06	24.82	1.12	387
39	76.42	23.28	0.30	380
40	73.54	26.02	0.44	335
41	74.50	24.70	0.80	402

Table11: Neural network feature ranking results

Feature deleted	Accuracy (%)	False positive rate	False negative rate	Number of epochs
All	87.07	6.66	6.27	412
1	91.57	7.36	1.07	400
2	77.92	21.22	0.86	420
3	80.68	16.50	2.82	473
4	90.16	9.13	0.71	312
5	90.16	8.88	0.96	438
6	77.23	22.13	0.64	339
7	76.87	22.06	1.07	419
8	72.98	26.28	0.74	389
9	84.89	14.40	0.71	298
10	54.08	45.11	0.81	385